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SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE HEARINGS ON VIETNAM  
February 17-20, 1970

OPENING STATEMENT

By  
Ambassador W. E. Colby  
Deputy to COMUSMACV for CORDS

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OPENING STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR W. E. COLBY  
FOR THE HEARINGS BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE  
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Mr. Chairman:

The leaders of North Vietnam call the conflict in Vietnam a People's War. They saw it as a new technique of war, one which would enable them to win despite greater military power on the side of the government and its allies. They believed they could seize control of the population and pull it from under the government structure, causing its collapse. For a time, it looked as though they might be correct. Their power steadily built up during the organizational phase of their effort during the late 1950's through the guerrilla period of the early 1960's to the stage in late 1964 when they sent North Vietnamese units to prepare a final assault on the centers of government authority. The scenario was interrupted, however, when American combat forces entered in mid-1965 to keep final victory from their grasp.

Since 1965, the Vietnamese and American Governments have been increasing their understanding of and forging the tools necessary to fight on the several levels of a people's war. The organizational tools were developed, the personnel were indoctrinated and the strategy outlined by which such a war must be conducted. This was a gradual process to which many Vietnamese, Americans and other nationals contributed. The process is by no means complete. Even more important, much of the execution of the program on the ground still lies ahead and setbacks will occur. However, the fundamentals have been identified and the program is well launched. As a result, the war called a People's War by the Communists is being increasingly waged by the Vietnamese people,

defending themselves against Communist attack, terror and subversion and at the same time building a better future of their own choosing.

What I will describe is only a part of our effort to bring the war in Vietnam to an end. President Nixon has clearly set the policy which the program I will describe supports. The President has stated three ways by which our participation in the war can be reduced: negotiations, a reduction of violence by Hanoi, and a strengthening of the Vietnamese Government and the people, which we call Vietnamization. The program I will describe falls under the last. Its objective is an increase in South Vietnam's capacity to defend itself, thereby permitting a reduction of American participation in the war. The lessons we have learned in Vietnam can increase Vietnam's ability to defend itself.

The program is called Pacification and Development by the Government of Vietnam. It operates behind the shield furnished by another aspect of our efforts in Vietnam, the military operations of the Vietnamese and allied armies. However bold, however well conceived, however logical this program, it has been amply proven that it cannot be effective unless hostile regiments and divisions are kept away. At the same time, however, we have found that their absence does not thereby produce peace nor offer political fulfillment to the people. While armies can repel armies, and can assist in the consolidation of security, the very power, organization and procedures which are essential in large-scale combat make it difficult for them to fight on all the levels of the People's War. Thus additional tactics and techniques had to be developed to fight on these other levels. Pacification and Development is this necessary counterpart to the military efforts of our forces in this new kind of war.

Security is a part of pacification, too, at these other levels. One level is territorial security, the ability of the farmer to sleep in his home at night

without fear of guerrillas foraging, conscripting or taxing. This security is provided by local forces and militia, permanently protecting the community while the regular troops operate against larger regular enemy units. To provide this protection, the Vietnamese Regional Forces operate within the provinces, normally in company strength. The Popular Forces operate within the village area, normally in platoon strength. Both of these forces are made up of full-time soldiers, uniformed, armed with modern weapons, and trained to conduct patrols and ambushes in the outskirts of the villages. Both have been substantially increased since 1968, so they now total approximately 475,000 men. Their effectiveness has also been improved under a program which was instituted between MACV and the Vietnamese Joint General Staff in October 1967. As a result, these forces now have M-16 rifles, special advisory teams of Americans to train and assist them, and effective systems of communications and fire support. They made a major contribution to the key 1969 strategy of expansion of the government's protection to hamlets and villages which had been deserted or abandoned to enemy control for several years, establishing islands of local security around which the population could cluster.

Territorial security, however, is not left only to full-time soldiers. In mid-1968, the Vietnamese Government launched a program to enlist all citizens in the nation's defense. The General Mobilization Law was passed by the National Assembly, requiring that all men from 16 to 50 help defend their country. Under this law, any man not in the expanded armed forces is required to be a member of the People's Self Defense Force, an unpaid militia, to defend his home community. To these are added volunteers from the elderly, young people from 12 to 15, and women. The government has distributed arms and trained these people. Initially, there were some faint hearts among Vietnamese officialdom over this distribution of weapons, as they looked back on the former war lords,

the political factions, the possibility of arming the Viet Cong and the chance the people might choose to act against the government itself. The President and the Prime Minister, however, took the position that it was only by showing this kind of trust in the people that a people's war could be properly fought. Today some 400,000 weapons have been made available to the People's Self Defense Force, over a million Vietnamese have been trained to use them or otherwise assist, and some 3,000,000 are claimed to have been enrolled. It is no fearsome military force, to be sure, and the number enrolled is a very soft statistic, but the Communists have identified it clearly as a major threat, a start toward a true people's army and a locally based political force for the future. As a result, they have attacked it and tried to destroy it, but it has stood its ground in many (not all) fights, and fully validated the government's confidence.

There is another level of security at which this new kind of war must be fought. In Vietnam, there is a secret Communist network within the society which tries to impose its authority on the people through terrorism and threat. This network, or as it is called in Vietnam, the VC Infrastructure, provides the political direction and control of the enemy's war within the villages and hamlets. It lays down the caches for the troops coming from the border sanctuaries; it provides the guides and intelligence for the North Vietnamese strangers; it conscripts, taxes and terrorizes. Protection against the North Vietnamese battalion or even the Viet Cong guerrilla group does not give real freedom if the elected Village Chief is assassinated, the grenade explodes in the market place or the traitor shoots the self-defender in the back. During 1969, for example, over 6,000 people were killed in such terrorist incidents, over 1,200 in selective assassinations, and 15,000 wounded. Among the dead were some 90 Village Chiefs and officials, 240 Hamlet Chiefs and officials, 229 refugees and 4,350 of the general populace.

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One of the major lessons about the People's War has been the key role the infrastructure plays in it. This Communist apparatus has been operating in Vietnam for many years and is well practiced in covert techniques. To fight the war on this level, the government developed a special program called PHUNG HOANG or PHOENIX. The government has publicized the need for this effort to protect the people against terrorism and has called upon all the citizens to assist by providing information, and they are doing so.

Since this is a sophisticated and experienced enemy, experts are also needed to combat it. Thus the PHOENIX program started in mid-1968 to bring together the police, the military and the other government organizations to contribute knowledge and act against this enemy infrastructure. It secures information about the enemy organization, identifies the individuals who make it up and conducts operations against them. These operations might consist of two policemen walking down the street to arrest an individual revealed as a member of the enemy apparatus or they might involve a three battalion attack on a jungle hideout of a district or province committee. As a result of this program, members of this apparatus are captured, turn themselves in as ralliers or are killed in fire fights. More needs to be done for this program to be fully effective, but the government has a high priority on it. Our own government provides advisory assistance and support to this internal security program through the police, the administration, the information services and the intelligence services. This is similar to our support of the military effort against the North Vietnamese battalions and Viet Cong guerrilla groups through the Vietnamese military forces.

But another of the major lessons learned over the years about the people's war is that security is not enough alone. Security in a people's war cannot be provided to the people, they must participate in the effort. For Vietnamese to do so, after the years of troubles they have seen, they must be convinced that one side offers and will deliver a better life for themselves and their families, that it has a chance of succeeding in the contest and that they will have a voice in the common effort. To convince them, and thus to engage the people in the endeavor, the government must develop a program to satisfy these three requirements. Pacification and Development is this policy, giving full weight to the people's security, their betterment and their voice in decision making. The combination of all three enlists the people on their government's side, the critical step in a People's War.

Thus as an integral element of its Pacification and Development Plan in 1969, the Government of Vietnam took a new approach to the village community in Vietnam. Rather than considering it the lowest of a series of bureaucratic levels through which authority descends from the Palace to the people, it became the first assemblage of the population to conduct its own affairs. Over the past year, elections have been held in 961 villages and 5,344 hamlets, elections which were held in the light of the day and with general popular participation. As a result, 95 percent of the 2,151 villages and 94 percent of the 10,522 hamlets today have elected local governments. These elections have been a clear contrast to the alleged elections held in Viet Cong base areas or by individual armed VC poll takers sneaking into isolated farm houses at night to require a single vote of approval of the People's Revolutionary Party candidate.

These officials need training to become effective. Thus 1,862 Village Chiefs and 8,532 Hamlet Chiefs from every part of the nation, plus a variety of other government workers at the village and hamlet level, to a total of over 30,000 have attended a special five-week course at a National Training Center. There they were told by President Thieu that they had full authority over affairs in their communities and that they were to consider themselves as the leaders of their people. Further to make this clear, the black pajama clad Rural Development Cadre, a national corps of 42,000 hamlet level political organizers, were divided into smaller teams and made subject to the elected village chief's directions.

In addition, in a reversal of previous practices, wherein the bureaucracy decided what was good for the villagers, development funds were passed directly to the village level for decision by the locally-elected village council as to what kinds of development projects the local people desired. They chose a vast variety from schools to pig raising to irrigation to hand tractors, but even more importantly they reacted with enthusiasm to this indication that they, not far away officials, were determining their future. This same process of stimulating local responsibility and participation is being applied to urban neighborhoods, in the form of improved walkways through the slums, rebuilt homes and fire fighting teams.

The development of the Vietnamese community also includes inviting members of the enemy camp to rejoin the national cause, where they are decently received and resettled. Some 47,000 people during the past year took this road to a new life with the GVN, almost one-third of the total of 140,000 since 1963. Many of these former enemies are now serving the government forces as guides, as members of the local defense forces and as members of teams inviting more of their ex-colleagues to join them.



In addition, the program to provide assistance to refugees and other war victims has been an element of the pacification effort. It, too, is aimed at the people, to assist them to re-establish their disrupted lives and to return to the villages where security now permits them to re-enter. Some 488,000 people during the past year have received financial and commodity assistance as they returned to their villages. Another 586,000 have been paid benefits at their new locations. Mr. William K. Hitchcock, of our Refugee Directorate, is here to testify in detail on this important part of the effort to bind the nation together.

To strengthen the national community, an information program is an element of Pacification and Development, to inform the people of their rights and privileges and the government's role in this program. Mr. Edward J. Nickel, our senior USIA officer in Vietnam and Director of our joint military-civilian US Public Affairs Office, will give you the details of this program.

The development of a better economy for the farmers in the countryside has also been an element of this total effort, opening lines of communication to markets, providing a new and more productive strain of rice and resuming the distribution of land to tenants which had been stalled during the war years. A variety of other developmental improvements such as new schools, new health stations, etc., also support the overall program. Mr. Donald G. MacDonald, Director of our USAID Mission in Vietnam, will testify separately on the details of those activities, but I want to point out that they are being integrated fully into the one national Pacification and Development program.

If this is the program then how does it work? What is the American role? How much does it cost? How many people are involved in it?

The first reply is that it is fundamentally a Vietnamese program. The territorial security forces are Vietnamese. The police are Vietnamese. The local hamlet and village officials are Vietnamese. Those who receive and resettle former members of the enemy camp are Vietnamese. Those who register and pay benefits to the refugees are Vietnamese. Those who sow the new rice, those who explain the government policies are all Vietnamese. In a people's war in Vietnam the people engaged in it will be Vietnamese.

Thus the Vietnamese play the major role in the program. The government has been organized to prosecute this program as a highest priority effort. The President, the Prime Minister and the government have established a Central Pacification and Development Council at the national level, with its own staff to draw together the diverse strands of this program into one effort. It developed a national Pacification and Development Plan for 1969 and has just completed one for 1970. This structure at the national level has counterparts at the regional and the province levels, where there are similar councils of all the different officials engaged in this multi-faceted program. Each province had a provincial plan for 1969 and now has one for 1970, in which it draws together the threads of the different programs to make one overall effort in the province.

Using this planning process, and some of the statistical reporting systems developed to support the program, goals are set, reports are required, and inspections conducted. The Province Chiefs and their Deputies have had a week long seminar at a national center at which each of the Ministers in turn described his Ministry's contribution to the national plan and answered probing questions from the Province Chiefs. Detailed comments were sent by the national staff to each province on the province plan, calling for correction or modification of any aspects which did not follow the overall guidelines. As a result, the Province Chiefs and the Corps Commanders are fully aware of their program for

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pacification and development in their area in specific terms, which hamlets are being re-entered, how the struggle to identify the Viet Cong Infrastructure is going in the various parts of the province, when the next elections are scheduled in the hamlets and villages, and where the irrigation ditch is being dug and how well it is progressing. The President and Prime Minister have removed 25 Province Chiefs and 162 District Chiefs in 1968 and 23 Province Chiefs and 110 District Chiefs in 1969 and 1970 to date,\* many for failing to measure up.

Even down to the village level, the plan has been pushed. In December, Village Chiefs in most provinces joined in meetings at the province capitals at which a Minister and a staff from the various other Ministries of the National Government explained the total program to them. The President and many of the Ministers frequently visit the Corps and the Provinces and have many times gone to individual villages for detailed question and answer discussions with the Village Chief and Village Council of the situation in their village and the impact of the Pacification and Development Plan there.

But I do not pretend that this is a totally Vietnamese effort. It obviously benefits from the shield produced by American forces as well as the Vietnamese Army divisions. The M-16 rifles carried by the Territorial Forces were made in America. Many of the funds used for the support of the refugees or for the village development programs come from counterpart generated by American imports. American advisors at all levels from national to district and even in some cases to the village or platoon discuss the program with their counterparts, come up with recommendations and ideas, go to the meetings where the program is discussed

\* Excluding shifts.

in Vietnamese with simultaneous English translation and help evaluate how well it is really going in the field.

The American contribution to this program is provided by an organization which in Vietnam is known as CORDS, an integral part of the United States Military Assistance Command (MACV). The word CORDS is an acronym which in itself symbolizes the learning process we have been through in Vietnam. In the early 1960's, each American agency in Vietnam had its separate structure and responsibilities, all of course under the overall control of the Ambassador. With the military buildup in 1965 and 1966, the US civil agencies also expanded their activities and particularly moved into the provinces, each with its own chain of command. As a result, many of the American programs, however good in themselves, were uncoordinated and Vietnamese officials in the provinces might be dealing with as many as four or five separate Americans, each giving him different advice.

In early 1966, the Deputy US Ambassador was named coordinator of field programs with a small staff. This authority, however, proved inadequate, and in December 1966 an Office of Civil Operations was established which had full command authority over the civilian agencies in the field. Province Chiefs then had only two advisors, one military and one civilian. In May 1967, the final step was taken of bringing the entire US field effort under one chain of command and one manager. Since security is so much a part of pacification, it was decided to place overall responsibility for pacification on the Commander of US Military Assistance Command, General Westmoreland, and to establish my predecessor, Ambassador Robert W. Komer, as his Deputy for CORDS, Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS). CORDS in the field took responsibility for the local military aspects of pacification, the Territorial Security

Forces, and the civilian aspects of pacification, i.e., the programs of the USAID Mission and the Information Agency or Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO). At the Saigon level these two civilian agencies maintain their independence for certain national programs, but their field operations are now under the single chain of command of the Commander US Military Assistance as a part of CORDS.

Thus today, CORDS has teams at the national, regional, provincial and district levels. It is a part of the military command structure, in Saigon fully under General Abrams, and in each of the corps zones it is under the Senior US Military Commander. It consists of 6,361 military personnel, 2,395 officers and 3,966 enlisted, and 948 civilians\*. Added to these are 188 third country personnel and 7,600 local Vietnamese nationals. There is complete military and civilian integration at all levels of CORDS. The staffs in Saigon are partly military and partly civilian. At the Corps level, there also are civilians and military working together on the staffs. In 25 provinces a military officer, a Colonel or Lt. Colonel, is the Province Senior Advisor, and in 19 provinces and four independent cities, a civilian, a Foreign Service Officer or a Foreign Service Reserve Officer, is the Province Senior Advisor. The civilian Province Senior Advisors have military deputies. The military Province Senior Advisors have civilian deputies. In 190 districts, the District Senior Advisor is a Major, but in 33 he is a civilian, and at the district level there are 96 civilians serving in all. The normal district level team has about eight members, the teams at province level vary from 30 to 70, the staffs at region number about 150 and the staff in Saigon numbers about 600, all levels including civilian as well as military personnel.

\* Authorized.

In addition to these advisory teams, there are two special groups of personnel who participate in the pacification mission. Some of these are in Mobile Advisory Teams, or MATs. These are Army teams of two officers and three NCOs whose job is to live, work with and assist in the improvement of Regional Force companies and Popular Force platoons. Another type of team involved in similar work is the US Marine Corps Combined Action Platoon or CAP. This consists of a squad of US Marines led by their Squad Leader, assigned to work with a Vietnamese Popular Force platoon, living in the same area, patrolling and generally helping them with their job and to improve their performance. There are 353 MAT teams which include 1,985 US Army personnel. There are 114 CAP teams which include approximately 2,000 Marines and Navy Corpsmen. Both of these teams are used in certain areas for a period, with a special emphasis on upgrading the local Regional or Popular Force units with which they are working. When they reach a satisfactory position, the team is moved to another area to repeat the process with another unit. The planning, of course, is that they will gradually complete this job of upgrading and that the program will then be phased out, leaving the Vietnamese local force unit to continue without direct American involvement.

These are the American personnel who work directly in the pacification program and with CORDS. In addition, of course, many American units conduct pacification activities in their assigned areas. You have recently heard of the activities of the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Binh Dinh Province. This is matched by a number of other American units which collaborate directly with Regional and Popular Force units to increase the effectiveness of these units and improve the territorial security of the area. The pacification program also profits from the many projects carried out by US units in the form of Civic

Action, many doctors from the Army, Navy and Air Force serve on special teams in province hospitals, and the Navy Seabees carry out many programs which both support pacification and train Vietnamese in skills for the future.

The funding of the CORDS operation comes from four sources, DOD's and AID's appropriations, AID's counterpart funds generated by imports, and the GVN's own budget from taxes, customs and deficit financing. The greater portion of the expenditures by both the US and the GVN is used for the territorial forces and the police, with AID supporting development and refugee programs. Both the US and GVN have substantially increased their investments in pacification over the past several years, which is certainly a major reason for its improvement. The 1970 contributions are:

DOD	\$ 729 million
AID	48 million
Counterpart	114 million (equivalent)
GVN	627 million (equivalent)

As can be seen, in funding as in personnel, CORDS is an integration of the programs of several agencies. It was designed to meet a new situation on the ground and it cuts across many of our familiar civil-military or departmental distinctions. It has been called a Rube Goldberg creation and I suppose in many respects it is. The key point, however, is that it is working and that it works with the Vietnamese.

Because it is the relationship with the Vietnamese which will decide whether the program will work or fail, it cannot be American. Americans can assist the Vietnamese temporarily and can help them take over the full program. Our resources are important. Our imagination and our energy are also important. But we must address these to helping Vietnamese to do the job themselves. This process will be described in detail by the officers who are accompanying me:

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Mr. John Vann of Colorado, the senior CORDS officer for IV Corps in the Delta; Mr. Hawthorne Mills of California, a Foreign Service Officer, the Province Senior Advisor in Tuyen Duc Province; Major James Arthur of North Carolina, the District Senior Advisor in Binh Chanh District in Gia Dinh Province; Captain Armand J. Murphy of Florida, RF/PF Advisor, Long An Province; Captain Richard T. Geck of New Jersey, who is the leader of a Mobile Advisory Team presently located at My Lam Village, Kien Thanh District, Kien Giang Province; and US Marine Sergeant E5 Richard E. Wallace of California, the leader of Marine Combined Action Platoon 2-1-5 whose present assignment is at Phu Son Hamlet in Hoa Luong Village in Hieu Duc District of Quang Nam Province. At each of these levels the Americans work closely with their Vietnamese counterparts. They discuss problems, they visit the field together, they approach the job as a joint effort. At the same time, each has his own responsibilities to his own government. The Vietnamese chain of command has complete authority over the subordinate levels. No commands can be given through American channels to Vietnamese. The relationship must be one of mutual exchange, trust and respect. At the same time, the Americans have responsibilities to their own government to report difficulties, to criticize where weaknesses exist and cannot be overcome locally, and to submit reports on their view of the situation in the area. These reports are in many cases made available to the Vietnamese counterpart, so he can see how he looks to his companion, and in some cases are made available to their superiors.

The combination of the Vietnamese Pacification and Development Program and American assistance to it have produced the change in Vietnam since 1968. This change did not occur in one year; rather it culminated the changes which



had been occurring over several ydars. In 1967, a Constitution was promulgated and a National Assembly and a President were elected. This was a beginning of political stability in Vietnam after years of turbulence. In 1968, it can now be said in retrospect, the enemy made a major military effort to crack the shield which was gradually being built by the Vietnamese and Americans learning how to fight the people's war. In his attacks at Tet, in May, and in August he threw his battalions, regiments and divisions into a major effort to shatter the Vietnamese Army, seize the centers of government power, and spark a general uprising. Despite the real psychological impact of his attacks, the fact is that he did not achieve any of these three goals. On the government side, a new resolution and drive showed itself in such developments as the General Mobilization Law, the increase of the Regular and Territorial Forces, and the beginning of the People's Self Defense Program. By autumn, it had become clear that the enemy's massive military assault had not succeeded and new strategies began to be applied. In November 1968, President Thieu launched the Accelerated Pacification Program, the first integrated civil-military program to move into the country, establish security, attack the Viet Cong apparatus, and begin the process of national mobilization under a comprehensive and integrated pacification plan. Its critical feature was the movement of Territorial Forces into the areas from which they had been driven during the Tet attacks. This actually occurred without substantial enemy opposition. This three-month campaign was followed by the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan. The key development of 1969 was further expansion in the new areas throughout the countryside. The government set very venturesome goals in early 1969, goals which gave many of its advisors doubts that it could meet them. In fact, it met most of them, although not all. As a result of these developments, the nature of the war

has changed. The enemy began a People's War of insurgency and ended by conducting primarily a North Vietnamese Army invasion. The Government and its allies first tried to meet the attack with conventional forces and tactics but are now utilizing all the techniques and programs of a People's War.

As a result of this long process, in early 1970 the change in the countryside is there to be seen. Except in one or two areas, the large enemy battalions, regiments and divisions are in the border sanctuaries. The roads are open to many markets and, from the air, tin roofs sparkle throughout the countryside where families are once again tilling their long-abandoned farms. We have statistical measures of all of these changes, imperfect but the best we could develop. But the real difference can only be experienced by driving on the roads, by visiting the markets, and by talking to a 12-year-old schoolgirl who informs you that she is again attending school in her village after a three-year period in which none existed. A friend once complained that the pacification program does not produce dramatic results. From day to day it does not, but the difference in Vietnam from Tet of 1968 is certainly dramatic to the Vietnamese peasant.

There is more work to be done. At night there are still guerrillas in Vietnam, and the roads open in the day are deserted and dark, occasionally criss-crossed by contending local forces. The grenades still go off in the theaters or tea shops as the terrorist demonstrates his continued presence. Some officials have by no means caught the spirit of the village community and endeavor to assert their old Mandarin privileges of dictation from above. There are still refugees and others whose lives have been blighted by the war who must be helped to a decent place in society. Most of all, North Vietnamese divisions are over the border or in jungle redoubts, and prepare for other sallies against South Vietnam.

At the beginning of 1970, however, there is a vast difference in the situation. The government is organized to conduct a People's War and is showing the leadership and drive to create a better and a safer society for its citizens. Its 1970 Pacification and Development Plan is in many respects more venturesome and ambitious than the 1969 plan. Its key lies in consolidation of the admittedly thin layer of security established in many areas. It also sets high goals in political, economic and social development, not all of which may be reachable. In response to its leadership and its policies, however, its citizens are beginning to participate in self defense, self government and self development. And the Army has repelled North Vietnamese assaults at Bu Prang and Ben Het. It is by no means inevitable that this process must continue, as several developments could arrest or even reverse it. The enemy is still in the field, and while we may have determined some of the tactics and techniques of this people's war, the lessons must be reflected in new kinds of action in every hamlet and village in the land. This process has begun, but the future will include some dark days and even some local disasters. I believe, however, that a satisfactory outcome can be achieved so the Vietnamese people will have a free choice as to their future.

The outcome will depend more and more upon Vietnamese leadership, upon Vietnamese commitment and even upon Vietnamese resources. We Americans have played a substantial role in learning about this new kind of war, but one of the lessons is that it must be waged by the people and not merely the government of Vietnam. The American contribution in personnel and in resources will gradually reduce, to be replaced by full mobilization of people willing to sacrifice to remain free and to carry out the programs to make these sacrifices meaningful.

The Vietnamese people and government are shouldering more of the load today than they did last year, and their plans and programs envisage a greater effort tomorrow. This is true in the military field; it is also true in the field of pacification and development. The lessons learned and applied about this new form of war are making the Vietnamese effort pay greater dividends in terms of local security, political support and hopes for peace. I am neither optimistic nor pessimistic about the future of this program and of Vietnam, nor do I offer any pat solutions to difficult situations. I prefer to rely upon the determination of the Vietnamese people and government and of the Americans who are now assisting them to take over this job. I am privileged to present to you today several representative Americans with this determination, and I invite you to hear from them what we have learned about the People's War and how it must be fought.

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STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD

On

The Administrative Aspects of Pacification and Development

By

Ambassador W. E. Colby

Mr. Chairman:

In this statement I will cover the organization, personnel, and costs of the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) effort. I will also describe briefly how it works and how it relates to the Vietnamese organization for Pacification and Development. In my opening statement I touched on the background of the organization and briefly traced the concept and evolution of its establishment. As I indicated, CORDS is a combined civil/military organization within the U.S. Military Assistance Command (MACV) headed by General Creighton Abrams. I am General Abrams' Deputy for Civil Operations and Rural Development Support.

I. U.S. Organization for Pacification and Development

- A. Exhibit A shows the organization of MACV. As you can see, CORDS is an integral part of MACV. Its headquarters component, headed by an Assistant Chief of Staff, operates under the Chief of Staff like

other headquarters staff elements and through the Chief of Staff to field commands. As General Abrams' Deputy for CORDS, I have access through the Chief of Staff to the Field Commands and to all the staff agencies, including CORDS. This same arrangement is repeated at the Corps level where each U.S. Field Force Commander has a Deputy for CORDS and a staff agency for CORDS. The Commander's responsibilities fall into three categories, command of any U.S. troops units in the area, the Vietnamese Army advisory effort, and the pacification and development advisory effort or CORDS. At Province level, the Province Senior Advisor, who may be military or civilian depending on the security situation, commands a unified CORDS organization. Twenty-five (25) Provinces currently have military Province Senior Advisors and nineteen (19) plus four autonomous cities have civilians.

- B. Exhibit B shows the relationship between CORDS and other Mission elements. While I am a member of the Mission Council, the CORDS organization itself relates

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to other U.S. Agency headquarters through the MACV structure. At the Saigon level, National Security Council Action Memorandum #362 of May 9, 1967, directed the establishment of MACCORDS and dealt with its relationship to other U.S. agencies. The Embassy, AID and JUSPAO all have independent headquarters staffs reporting directly to Ambassador Bunker. However, their field activities and personnel operate through the MACV chain of command. Thus, all field activities are under a single manager: MACV. This arrangement is an unprecedented approach, melding civil and military responsibilities and personnel into one organization.

- C. Within CORDS there are staffs for each element of the Pacification and Development program. The Refugee, Chieu Hoi, Public Safety, and Community Development Directorates are concerned with civil oriented programs and therefore are staffed mainly by civilians. The Territorial Security Directorate staff is mainly military. The other Directorates, like Plans, Policy and Programs, Reports and Analysis, and Management Support are more fully combined

Directors is to advise their counterpart GVN agencies. In addition, they have internal MACV staff responsibilities.

## II. GVN Organization for Pacification and Development

- A. Exhibit C shows how the Vietnam Central Pacification and Development Council is organized. As you can see there are similar councils down through the GVN chain of command; at corps and province. I have weekly meetings with Major General Hon who is Chief of the Pacification Coordination Center, in effect the principal staff manager of Pacification and Development. Mr. McManaway, Director of Plans, Policy and Programs of CORDS, meets with General Hon more frequently, at times daily. I also meet frequently with the Prime Minister, but these meetings are not on a regularly scheduled basis. At these meetings, we discuss a wide variety of problems and proposals dealing with Pacification and Development.
- B. I will not describe here what the advisors at corps, province, and district do on a day-to-day basis



available here today who will be discussing that with you, but in general the relationship with the Vietnamese follows the pattern at the central level, growing closer at province and district level.

### III. Personnel

- A. CORDS has 7,627 authorized U.S. personnel spaces. The actual on-board figure varies, of course, but as of the end of January the fill was 7,368 personnel or about 96%. Exhibit D breaks out the authorized figures. The great majority of total personnel are assigned in the field.
- B. The largest single advisory element is the one most closely related to Vietnamization and U.S. troop redeployment. This element is the 353, 5-man Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT) who rotate among the Vietnamese Regional and Popular Forces with the mission of assisting them in upgrading their effectiveness.
- C. A similar approach toward the same objective is the Combined Action Platoon (CAP) concept employed by the Marines in I Corps. There are 114 CAP Teams who

report through the I Corps Marine chain of command rather than the CORDS structure so they are not included in Exhibit D figures. Coordination takes place at the CTZ and province levels. We have with us today representatives of both the MATs and CAPs who will be describing what they do in more detail.

- D. The total number of military personnel in CORDS is 6,437: 2,427 officers and 4,010 enlisted men. The majority are at Province and District levels and are involved in advising their Vietnamese counterparts on programs, as well as general management and advisory support.
- E. We have 883 civilian officers, from AID and the Department of State assigned to CORDS. These personnel work in those areas of activity for which CORDS has full responsibility, such as Refugees, Chieu Hoi, and Community Development. This category does not include USAID technicians

working in the areas of education, health, and agriculture, nor certain State Department personnel who are assigned by the Embassy to the field and thus come under the operational control of, rather than assignment to, MACV. The latter category totals some 242 positions.

- F. The last category of U.S. personnel is DOD-funded civilians assigned to CORDS. There are 65 people in this category. These people work mainly in the Rural Development (RD) Cadre and Phoenix programs both at headquarters and in the field.

#### IV. Selection and Training

- A. These, then, are the Americans involved. I will now describe how they are selected, trained and how they are assigned.
- B. Military advisors, particularly those serving as Province Senior Advisors (PSA) or Deputy Province Senior Advisors (DPSA) are carefully screened and selected through a special process set up for this purpose by the Department of the Army (DA). The

Chief of Staff, General Westmoreland, personally notifies each individual selected and obtains his acceptance of the assignment in writing. DSAs are also selected by special, but less elaborate, procedure by the Career Branch, Department of the Army.

- C. Senior civilian officers, including those in PSA and DPSA positions, are initially selected by nomination by their parent agency, AID or Department of State. The nominations are sent to USAID/Saigon which, in coordination with ACoFS, CORDS and myself, reviews and accepts or rejects the nomination.
- D. The military PSA/DPSA serves an 18-month tour and the DSA at least 12 months with options for extending. Civilian tours are at least 18 months. Some 45-50% of all civilian advisors return at their request for a second tour and in a number of key positions, particularly at the Saigon and Corps levels, we have officers with long and extensive experience in Vietnam and Southeast Asia generally.

- E. All civilian advisors receive at least seven weeks training at the Foreign Service Institute. The majority of junior officers, both AID and Department of State, receive up to forty-two weeks of language training in Washington depending on the individual's language aptitude determined through special tests.
- F. For Province Senior Advisors and their deputies, both military and civilian, there is a special course at the Vietnam Training Center in Washington. The course includes language training and may extend as long as forty-two weeks depending on the individual's needs. Once in country, there are orientation briefings in Saigon, plus orientations when they report in at Corps and Province. The District Senior Advisors and their deputies receive 18 weeks training at the Vietnam Training Center.
- G. In addition to the above there is a 5-day CORDS Advisor Orientation Course for all newly arrived personnel which provides a comprehensive review of all aspects of pacification. There is also an in-country Vietnamese language training program run by CORDS available to all CORDS personnel.

- H. The MAT Team members have a special course at the Di An Training Center which runs 18 days covering all facets of their role in training and upgrading the RF and PF.
- I. In terms of quality, I would say that overall we probably have had and continue to have some of the best and most dedicated officers in the U.S. Government serving in Vietnam. They are for the most part hand picked. Where an officer cannot or will not perform satisfactorily he is removed at once and either assigned to another job where he can perform or sent home. Precise figures are not available, but the CORDS military advisors do receive a high percentage of the total awards and decorations presented to MACV advisors. The CORDS civilians also have a record of dedication and achievement. Over the past year and a half there have been 24 killed, 45 wounded and 12 captured. Of the latter, one was released, one escaped, and four to the best of our knowledge have died in captivity. Since the establishment of CORDS, its civilians have been

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awarded the U.S. Secretary's Award twice, the

Award for Heroism 18 times, the Distinguished  
Honor Award five times and the Superior Honor  
Award 11 times. More than 60 have received the  
Meritorious Honor Award and about 400 have received  
awards from the Vietnamese Government.

V. Reporting

- A. At this point I would like to discuss the reporting systems used by both the Americans and the Vietnamese in managing pacification and judging its trends. There are a number of systems now in use. These include systems reporting on terrorist incidents, Territorial Forces Evaluation, People's Self Defense Forces, National Police evaluation, the refugee situation, and others. The most important, especially in terms of overall trends in security, is the Hamlet Evaluation System. I will discuss this system in some detail and some recent changes that have been worked into it.
- B. The HES was started in January 1967 to provide a way to measure trends in pacification progress country-wide. The system was developed to provide automated

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data processing of comprehensive evaluations of  
the situation in each hamlet level prepared by  
District Senior Advisors.

- C. Each rater evaluates the hamlets in his district in terms of 18 separate indicators. Nine of the indicators are related to hamlet security and nine to socio-economic development. Each of the 18 indicators can be rated on a scale of five points running from A through E. Enemy controlled hamlets are simply rated as Category V. Scores are averages of these ratings.
- D. In addition to the 18 indicator ratings, evaluators are also required to report estimates of hamlet population, map coordinates, and whether or not the hamlet was visited by GVN or U.S. officials during the month.
- E. The Hamlet Evaluation System has been an effective tool for planning and managing pacification and related programs in Vietnam since 1967. The ratings are certainly not absolute measurements of security or development but they have been valuable comparative indicators of the pacification situation at different



times and in different places. Weaknesses in the system have been relatively constant, thus the figures are useful trend indicators. They have served as a basis for allocating new resources, identifying weak areas, planning expansion of pacification, setting of goals and monitoring performance.

- F. To improve HES and make it more useful, a revision has been in process since June 1968. This has involved a three-month trial period, November and December 1968, and January 1969, plus extensive revision and discussion thereafter. In July 1969, the new system called HES 70 was implemented in all districts of Vietnam and has been completed regularly in parallel with the regular HES. Since the GVN pacification and development plan for 1969 utilized HES extensively, it was believed essential to continue HES trends and measurements through the completion of the 1969 plan. This also gave us some solid experience with HES 70.
- G. HES 70 differs from the current HES in the following respects:

- (1) More objective questions which separately determine answers to specific conditions rather than the use of a grading scale.
- (2) HES 70 uses a centralized mathematical scoring technique for question replies, rather than a subjective grading by the District Senior advisor. Questions are combined into categories, these then combined to achieve security, political and socio/economic ratings, and these then combined to provide an overall pacification rating for each hamlet and village in Vietnam.
- (3) More data will be available centrally because of additional specific questions on hamlets and villages throughout the country.
- (4) In HES 70 there are separate questions on both hamlet and village level, and separate questions monthly and quarterly. The questions cover additional subjects not covered by the current HES, but because some are answered only quarterly, fewer questions per month are completed by the District Senior advisor.

VI. Costs

- A. The last part of my statement will cover pacification funding, how much the programs I described in other statements, and the organization and advisory support I have just discussed, costs and how the GVN and the U.S. Government share the burden.
- B. The total financial resources going into pacification have risen over the past five years as you can see on Exhibit E. As significant as the magnitude of the increase is the composition. The upward trend reflects the result of the GVN itself applying more of its own revenue and resources to pacification, a strong indication of the priority the GVN now places on the program, particularly in light of current budgetary constraints. While it is true that the U.S. is still providing about half of the costs, this is largely the result of new equipment and material requirements to support increased numbers of Regional and Popular Forces. As these new U.S. dollar procurement requirements are met and the U.S. share is reduced to replacement requirements, the GVN will be carrying the greater share of pacification costs.

VII. Conclusion

That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I will be happy to answer any questions you or the committee members may have.

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EXHIBIT A  
MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM






EXHIBIT B



RELATIONSHIP OF CORDS TO U.S. MISSION

GVN PACIFICATION ORGANIZATION





**CORDS US GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL**  
(AUTHORIZED)

SOURCE OF PERSONNEL	MILITARY	CIVILIAN	TOTAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	6361		
MILITARY			
ARMY	(6294)		
NAVY	(23)		
AIR FORCE	(8)		
MARINE	(35)		
COASTGUARD	(1)		
TOTAL	(6361)		
CIVILIAN		65	6426
AID FOREIGN-SERVICE			
ASSIGNED TO MACV		733	
MACV OPN CONTROL		211	944
STATE FOREIGN-SERVICE			
ASSIGNED TO MACV		150	
MACV OPN CONTROL		11	161
JUSPAO			
MACV OPN CONTROL	76	20	96
USIA	(20)		
ARMY	(45)		
NAVY	(10)		
AIR FORCE	(15)		
MARINE	(6)		
TOTALS	6437	1190	7627

MILLIONS

TRENDS IN PACIFICATION FUNDING

1966-1970

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1600

1400

1200

1000

800

600

400

200

CVN

US

1,519.1

1,337.4

1,067.9

788.6

554.5

52%

677.1

51%

777.4

51%

581.9

424.2

54%

292.2

50%

364.4

46%

513.4

48%

660.3

49%

741.7

49%

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

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